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Abstract: In this paper I argue that the development of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) can be understood as a form of ‘externalization of EU governance’. In 
2004 and 2007, the EU enlarged to encompass twelve new member states and thus 
acquired a new neighbourhood, notably in Eastern Europe. Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and 
Moldova now share a common border with the EU. Since 2001/02, the EU has been 
developing the ENP to cope with the challenges resulting from this new political 
landscape, and as such, the ENP is now the primary instrument through which EU 
governance is externalized. With the exception of Belarus and Russia, the European 
Union’s Eastern neighbours are intent on acquiring EU membership. The EU, in turn, is 
keen on maintaining its Eastern borders safe and secure from external risks such as 
illegal migration, environmental degradation and economic crisis. In order to meet these 
objectives, the EU promotes democratic and economic reforms in the countries located 
along its Eastern border and in doing so strives to foster political stability and security in 
the wider Europe. While hierarchy and negotiation constitute the dominant modes of 
governance in enlargement, this paper will demonstrate that coordination and 
competition – albeit in the shadow of hierarchy – are the most central modes of 
governance discernible within the European Neighbourhood Policy. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 I. Introduction 
The 2004 and 2007 enlargements have pushed the European Union (EU)
1 much closer 
towards what is now conceived as a ‘new neighbourhood’ – notably in Eastern Europe. 
Still, concepts such as the ‘European neighbourhood’ or a ‘wider Europe’ that have 
recently entered the academic discourse are not quite new: While they do not resound the 
hegemonic notion of the Kremlin’s idea of a ‘near abroad’
2 designating the former Soviet 
Republics in a presumably Russian sphere of influence, these concepts started to enter 
into EU jargon at a time when the Forwards Study Unit
3 of the European Commission 
crafted a particularly bleak scenario of “turbulent neighbourhoods” at the doorsteps of an 
expanding European Union. According to this scenario, the Europeans would fall victim 
to a siege or fortress mentality by 2010 as the EU would be doomed to fail “to implement 
an effective cordon sanitaire strategy” (European Commission 1999: 50) along its post-
enlargement borders and would not be capable of addressing issues such as illegal 
immigration, environmental hazards and pandemics which may spread in the wake of 
weak or failing states (see Moroff 2002 and 2003). The question how to establish an 
effective ‘cordon sanitaire’, or how to equip the European Union with a role in 
influencing the countries of such a geopolitical ‘grey zone’ and, ultimately, how the EU 
extends governance beyond its borders,
4 is definitely at the bottom line of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).
5
In the run-up to the final accession talks for the ten new member countries in 
2001, the European Union began to sketch out a unique policy mix, enshrining not only a 
privileged, but also a deeper political relationship as well as economic integration, built 
upon a mutual commitment to common values. Consequently, the European Commission 
  2President Romano Prodi described the purpose of the ENP as creating a “ring of friends 
surrounding the Union and its closest European neighbours, from Morocco to Russia and 
the Black Sea” (Prodi 2002; emphasis added). While there is a strong normative aspect 
discernible in the Commission’s approach, the European Security Strategy, which was 
drafted at the same time under the aegis of the Council Secretariat, in turn, is much more 
pragmatic, favouring the creation of “a ring of well governed countries” (European 
Security Strategy 2003: 8; emphasis added; Missiroli 2007: 2). Henceforth, the ENP was 
set to exhibit both a normative roll call for Europe as well as a practical policy tool kit for 
the ‘new Europe’: fostering intensified cooperation and encompassing EU neighbouring 
countries of Northern Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe.
6
The European Neighbourhood Policy builds into the framework of EU 
enlargement as much as it recurs to elements of the EC trade and development policy. Its 
primary goal is to enhance the EU’s overall relationship with these neighbouring 
countries – at both a collective and individual level. Thus, the ENP is an attempt to 
square the circle by reaping the benefits of enlargement in terms of the EU’s patronizing 
role in guiding domestic political reform and economic transition in (neighbouring) third 
countries, without mandating the EU to promise future membership. The conundrum that 
evolves from this, in a nutshell, is the following: How can the European Union take 
advantage of enlargement-tested ‘conditionality’ and, for that matter, expect compliance 
from neighbouring countries without relying on the golden carrot of membership (Magen 
2006)? Or to put the question into the perspective of this volume on modes of new 
governance in the EU’s policy-making, how can the EU govern its immediate vicinity 
  3without the hierarchy-inducing prospect of future accession, hence relying on a silver 
carrot of a nothing but privileged relationship of some kind? 
The first section will seek to establish the European Neighbourhood Policy as a 
domain within the EU’s ‘external relations’ – broadly conceived. While enlargement is 
an important aspect of path-dependency within ENP, the European Union has been 
adamant to reinforce an external relations perspective for its neighbourhood policies. The 
second section will then address more specifically the origins of ENP in external 
relations. The third section will assess the ENP policy-making process and the role of 
central actors and institutions, in particular the European Commission as well as 
individual member states. Towards the backdrop of the empirical assessment, the fourth 
section will describe the dominant modes of governance and explain why there have been 
shifts over time in terms of governance modes which are present in the area of ENP. 
While hierarchy and negotiation constitute the dominant mode of governance in 
enlargement policies and practices, this contribution will demonstrate that coordination 
and competition – albeit in the shadow of hierarchy – are the most central modes of 
governance discernible within the European Neighbourhood Policy. 
 
II. ‘Neither (quite) in nor (quite) out’: Establishing a new policy area in the EU’s 
external relations 
Since the beginning of European integration, the EC/EU has been compelled to foster 
relations with third countries as well as other organizations of regional integration in 
Europe and the world. The EC/EU pursues relations at a bilateral or multilateral level, or 
a mixture of both. Clearly, the EC/EU has always declared to be in favour of regional 
  4cooperation within and beyond its borders, e.g. vis-à-vis the Benelux, or Mercosur in 
South-America or, in the context of enlargement, the Central European Free Trade Area 
(CEFTA) – despite the fact that official EU rhetoric has not always matched EU politics 
in this respect. While the EU encouraged Central and East European countries aspiring 
for EU membership into some form of regional arrangement, the politics of enlargement 
has, on the contrary, prioritized the bilateral relationship between each country and the 
European Union. 
In addition to that, some alternative schemes of regional integration in Europe, 
such as the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) or more recently the Single 
Economic Space in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Malfliet et al 2007; Mattli 1999), 
were construed to provide an option for those states in Europe that did not aspire for the 
EC’s far-reaching purposes in terms of economic and political integration nor subscribed 
to the EC’s distinct supranational character. Ultimately, it was only in the 1970s that the 
EC developed into the central core of regional integration in Western Europe; and, 
finally, it was in the aftermath of the Cold War that the EC/EU gained recognition as the 
central institution for integrating both hemispheres of Europe – West and East. However, 
as it has been the case with EC/EU enlargement, the Community also sought for means to 
effectively protect itself against potentially detrimental effects of rapid institutional 
enlargements and massive expansions of membership. In this light, the European 
Economic Area (EEA) of 1989, encompassing former EFTA countries and EC/EU 
member states also aimed at providing an alternative model of integration into selected 
policy areas of the EC/EU below the level of EC/EU membership. Without offering any 
sort of participation in the decision-making processes of the EU institutions, the 
  5European Economic Area (EEA) extended the single market to EFTA countries. 
Arrangements such as a ‘Wider European Economic Area’ or a ‘Deep Free Trade’ are at 
the forefront of discussions about the finality of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(Emerson et al 2006). Whereas most of the EEA member countries are content with the 
quality and level of integration into the European Union, such an approach would 
underestimate the desire of many ENP countries to actually become a member of the 
European Union. Thus, ENP cannot only be regarded through the lens of external 
relations with close European neighbours; it also needs to be addressed as a component of 
the EU’s post-accession strategy in post-enlargement Europe. 
Clearly, for most of the time, the Cold War determined rather narrowly the 
potential scope of inter-state relations in Europe as well as the prospects for European 
unification. However, it was only with the end of the East-West conflict that the EC/EU 
was urged to fundamentally redefine its relationship with the states of Central and 
Eastern Europe. So far, the European Union has pursued a gradual (albeit incremental) 
and differentiated rapprochement prior to ultimate inclusion. According to Karen E. 
Smith, the history between the EU and Central and Eastern Europe can be read, by and 
large, as the European Union “coping with the exclusion/inclusion dilemma by eventually 
choosing inclusion” (Smith 2005: 57). With the most recent rounds of enlargement as 
well as the prospective expansion to include the countries of South-Eastern Europe, 
inclusion clearly won or is likely to win out over exclusion. However, as at the same time 
‘enlargement fatigue’ in many EU member states (with a sharp cleavage between old and 
new members though) has risen to an unexpected magnitude. Therefore, it is highly 
questionable whether the ‘inclusionary approach’ will continue to prevail in the future. 
  6To solve this dilemma, the European Union has proposed the European Neighbourhood 
Policy as a framework for creating an intermediate stage in an attempt to escape the 
binary logic of inclusion and exclusion.
7
This approach makes the European Neighbourhood Policy rather unique. ENP 
comes close to concepts such as ‘privileged partnership’ or ‘strategic partnership’, which, 
ironically, are now applied to Turkey and Russia. Although Turkey is on an EU accession 
track, a number of politicians in EU member countries – in particular in France and 
Germany – would like to see Turkey rather as a privileged partner than a full-fledged 
member of the European Union. Hence, some authors (and politicians) also consider ENP 
in terms of a potential exit strategy for candidate countries. The Russian government, in 
turn, is developing a ‘strategic partnership’ sui generis with the EU, despite the fact that 
the Commission had hoped to include the Russian Federation into the European 
Neighbourhood Policy at an early drafting stage. Both the EU and Russia have agreed 
upon the creation of the so-called ‘Common Spaces’ (encompassing economic 
cooperation as well as cooperation in the fields of external and internal security, plus 
education and research) at the EU-Russia summit in St. Petersburg in May 2003. Clearly, 
this decision provided an unintended ‘enlargement twist’ to ENP as it brought countries 
in Eastern Europe together which, by and large, share the goal of EU membership. 
Anyhow, one should not forget that the offer of ENP in 2004 did not satisfy the high 
aspirations of either the Ukrainian or the Moldovan government who are eager to acquire 
a clear EU membership perspective. 
Paradoxically, throughout the process of EU accession, enlargement policy has 
lost its foreign and security policy punch (K. E. Smith 1999), and turned much more into 
  7a pre-domestic policy which aimed at ensuring a sufficiently high level of anticipatory 
adaptation or compliance with EU norms, standards and policies prior to accession. By 
doing so, the European Union was able to equip the process enlargement with sufficient 
legitimacy over (softly) intervening into the domestic politics of ‘third’ countries. EU 
officials and policy-makers, in turn, are adamant in manifesting the European 
Neighbourhood Policy as a foreign policy, albeit a “modern, intelligent foreign policy, 
stepping beyond traditional diplomacy of the 20
th century” (Benita Ferrero-Waldner 
2006; author’s translation) as stated by the Commissioner responsible for External 
Relations and the ENP. Hence, as put by the Director General of DG External Relations, 
the ENP does not declare future membership but rather political and economic “transition 
as a goal in its own right” (Landaburu 2006: 2) and seeks to acquire legitimacy by 
supporting delivery of efficient reforms in these neighbouring countries. 
 
III. The Development of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
The development of ENP has been described as highly path-dependent and “clearly 
modelled […] on the enlargement process” (Kelley 2006: 30). However, it should not be 
overlooked that some of the questions pertaining to ENP were on the table at a much 
earlier stage of European integration, when the EC/EU was compelled to define its 
relations with European countries and neighbours who had, for various reasons, no 
interest in contemplating accession to the Community. In dealing with its immediate 
vicinity, the EC/EU projected three basic, sometimes interlinking models throughout the 
1990s. First, it devised comprehensive, all-inclusive models of pan-European cooperation 
(such as the EEA or the ‘European confederation’ and the Europe Conference, which I 
  8will describe later); second, it developed differentiated approaches of gradual and 
conditional integration of individual countries
8 into the EC/EU (based on the so-called 
Europe Agreements) or cooperation/integration with the EC/EU (based on the Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreements); and, third, the European Union fostered regional foci in 
terms of its external relations, involving the EU and non-EU countries (particularly in the 
context of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, the so-called ‘Barcelona process’, the 
‘Northern Dimension’ Initiative and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe) and 
blurring the line between internal and external policies. 
As early as January 1990, French President François Mitterrand tabled the idea of 
establishing a European Confederation providing links between all European states – 
including the Soviet Union (Weisenfeld 1991, 1993: 356ff.). Ultimately, this idea would 
have brought the EC very close to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE), which at that time was preparing negotiations for the Charter of Paris 
(November 1990). In April 1991, the European Commissioner for External Relations, 
Frans Andriessen, suggested creating the status of ‘affiliated members’ who were 
supposed to have a voice, but no vote in a number of specified areas, such as foreign 
policy, transport, environment, monetary affairs and research (quoted in K. E. Smith 
1998). This status was, in a sense, similar to what the Community had awarded to 
Germany’s Eastern länder following the reunification of Germany up until 1994, as East 
German MEPs were granted observer status in the European Parliament (Gänzle 2007: 
115). In June 1992, the European Commission sketched out the idea of a ‘European 
Political Area’ which would provide a forum for regular meetings of EU member-states 
and associated countries from Central and Eastern Europe. One year later, in June 1993, 
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the ‘structured dialogue’, a “framework for discussions on all areas of EU business” 
(Smith 2005: 761). Concomitantly, the EU fleshed out a similar, but less ambitious policy 
vis-à-vis those countries of Eastern Europe that were likely – for various reasons – to be 
left out of the enlargement process for the foreseeable future, specifically Russia and 
Ukraine. Most important in this regard were the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements 
signed in 1994, and the launch of Common Strategies in 1999. While both agreements 
set-out a plethora of inter-institutional relations and called upon Russia and Ukraine to 
pursue political and economic reforms, none of them created a perspective for the 
relationship that once might transcend the creation of a common market with the 
European Union. 
In 1997, the European Union decided to upgrade the structured dialogue with the 
Central and East European countries to a ‘European Conference’, thereby including 
countries such as Switzerland, Iceland, Turkey and Norway in the process. European 
conferences involved regular meeting of heads of state and government to discuss a wide 
range of policy issues which were of mutual interest. The conferences were primarily 
offered in order to mollify Turkey for not being considered as a candidate for EU 
enlargement at the Luxembourg EU summit; yet, for a number of years, Turkey refused 
to participate. At the Göteborg European Council of June 2001, the EU member states 
decided to invite Ukraine, Moldova, and Russia as well as the countries of Western 
Balkans to the European Conference. Still, running short of any political decision-making 
capacities, the European Conference largely remained an exercise in symbolic politics 
which did not yield any major success. 
  10The Northern Dimension Initiative, comparable to the ‘Barcelona process’ 
starting in 1995, offered yet another approach. The initiative was launched by the Finnish 
government in 1997 in order to raise EU-wide awareness of the particular 
(environmental) needs and concerns of Northern Europe and its immediate vicinity 
(Russia, the ‘Baltic States’ and Poland). Similar to the European Conference, albeit 
limited in its geographical scope, Finland and Denmark organized Northern Dimension 
conferences involving Russia in the context of a ‘partnership approach’; yet, neither the 
Northern Dimension conferences nor the European Conference itself allowed non-EU 
members a seat at the decision-making table. 
Hence, the European Neighbourhood Policy, inspired by a number of policy 
instruments devised in the context of EU enlargement, is strongly entrenched in the 
practice of close neighbourly relations below the level of membership, such as the 
European Economic Area. While this approach might be sufficient for countries from the 
Mediterranean rim and the Middle East, it does not match the hopes and aspirations of 
those European or Western NIS, like Ukraine and Moldova, which are aspiring for 
stronger inclusion in the institutions of the West. 
 
IV. The European Neighbourhood Policy: the Policy-making Process, Institutions 
and Actors 
A variety of EU institutions and actors – in particular the new member states – are at play 
in the policy-making processes of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Simply put, it can 
be said that intergovernmental institutions – such as the European Council and the 
Council of Ministers (in its General Affairs Council formation) – provide the overall 
  11policy-guidance and direction for ENP, whereas the European Commission is much more 
versed in the day-to-day management and operational matters of ENP. Similar to the 
early stages of EU enlargement, where the Commission had been “catapulted into 
leadership” (Pelkmans/Murphy 1991), the European Commission so far has been able to 
assume a fair amount of policy entrepreneurship within the making and developing of 
ENP. The European Parliament, in turn, is not only involved in terms the of co-decision 
procedure on ENP matters (such as the budget), but also when it comes to developing 
policy ideas about ENP itself.  
The first concrete steps leading to ENP, however, were taken following a letter 
from the British foreign minister to the then Spanish Presidency of the European Union in 
January 2002. In this document Foreign Minister Jack Straw suggested to offer Ukraine, 
Belarus and Moldova “clear and practical incentives” for proceeding with political and 
economic reform. Furthermore, his proposal included granting these countries the status 
of “special neighbour” based on a firm commitment to democratic governance and free 
market principles (Comelli 2005: 13). At this stage, the countries of the Southern 
Mediterranean area were not yet included as potential candidates for such an inclusive 
approach. Meeting with the same resistance of Southern EU members to Eastern 
enlargement throughout the 1990s (which had brought to life the ‘Barcelona process’) the 
geographical scope of the new policy was quickly broadened to include both Russia and 
Southern Mediterranean rim (Johansson 2007). In August 2002, the High Representative 
of the CFSP, Javier Solana, and the EU Commissioner for External Relations, Chris 
Patten, addressed a joint letter to the Danish EU Presidency inviting the European 
Council of Copenhagen in December of that year to contemplate the “dual challenge of 
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borders of the Union” (Patten and Solana 2002: 1). At the same time, DG Enlargement 
was the object of bureaucratic reshuffling as it became obvious that the number of 
accession teams needed to be reduced in the very near future (Kelley 2006). Hence for 
inertia, it was the Enlargement Commissioner, Günter Verheugen, who signed up for the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (and not his colleague Chris Patten). It is likely that 
some “bureaucratic politics” (Missiroli 2007: 2; Kelley 2006) had occurred at this stage 
of the policy development. Similarly, at the same time, Javier Solana attempted to 
strengthen the foreign policy perspective vis-à-vis the neighbourhood as the European 
Security Strategy, whose first draft he presented in December 2003, declaring that 
“building security in our neighbourhood” (European Security Strategy 2003: 7) was 
amongst the core strategic objectives of the EU. With regards to Eastern Europe, the 
Strategy affirms that “[i]t is not in our interest that enlargement should create new 
dividing lines in Europe. We need to extend the benefits of economic and political 
cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling political problems there. We 
should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern 
Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region” (European Security 
Strategy 2003: 7-8). 
Still, it was the European Council of Copenhagen in December 2002 that 
approved of the idea of a ‘Wider Europe’ in principle. Another strong intergovernmental 
component was added by the ‘Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe’ in 2003/04, 
which proposed the category of a ‘special relationship’ to be reserved for immediate 
  13neighbours aspiring for closer relations. Hence, Art. I-57 of the ‘European Constitution’ 
stipulates: 
 
“1. The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, 
aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on 
the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on 
cooperation. 
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the Union may conclude specific agreements 
with the countries concerned. These agreements may contain reciprocal rights and 
obligations as well as the possibility of undertaking activities jointly. Their 
implementation shall be the subject of periodic consultation.” 
 
Although the Treaty is unlikely to be ratified in its current form, most of the objectives 
expressed above became a vital part of ENP. In May 2004, the European Commission 
published its Strategy Paper on the European Neighbourhood Policy. In this document, 
the Commission laid out the principles and objectives that would govern all future ENP 
partnerships. The ENP aims at “sharing the benefits of the EU’s enlargement in 2004 
with neighbouring countries in strengthening stability, security and well-being for all 
concerned” in order to “prevent the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe” 
(European Commission 2003: 4). Throughout the process of drafting the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, the normative tone was upheld:  
 
The EU has a duty, not only towards its citizens and those of the new member-
states, but also towards its present and future neighbours to ensure continuing 
social cohesion and economic dynamism. The EU must act to promote the 
regional and sub-regional cooperation and integration that are preconditions for 
political stability, economic development and the reduction of poverty and social 
divisions in our shared environment (European Commission 2003: 3). 
 
  14Towards this background, ENP is designed to contribute towards greater regional 
security. The Commission President Prodi emphasized that the “aim is to extend to this 
neighbouring region a set of principles, values and standards which define the very 
essence of the European Union” (Prodi 2002). The European Union attempted to make 
clear that ENP was about partnership with, and not membership in the European Union. 
Still, various Commission officials sought to remain ambivalent in terms of the 
membership issue. While, for instance, the Commissioner for Enlargement, Günter 
Verheugen (Fraser 2007; Beunderman 2006), declared that Ukraine was not going to 
become an EU member any time soon, the Commission President Romano Prodi declared 
that “[w]e have to be prepared to offer more than partnership and less than membership, 
without precluding the latter” (Prodi 2002). In a nutshell, ENP seeks to extend the 
“chance to participate in various EU activities through greater political, security, 
economic and cultural cooperation” (European Commission 2003: 3) – albeit below the 
membership level. If not membership, what else could be offered as an incentive? In 
March 2003, the European Commission asserted that the EU’s neighbours should be 
offered the prospect of “a stake in the EU’s Internal Market” (European Commission 
2003: 4). Subsequently, this incentive evolved into more concrete suggestions such as 
special Free Trade Agreements or participation in EU programmes and agencies 
(European Commission 2006). 
Policy-making processes within the European Neighbourhood Policy rest upon 
several key principles: First, the ENP subscribes to a traditional institutional approach as 
it is built into the existing framework of the EU’s bilateral relations with a respective 
ENP partner country. Thereby the European Union attempts to avoid duplicating existing 
  15institutional structures. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (which were 
developed in the first half of the 1990s to serve the NIS) and the Association Agreements 
with the Mediterranean countries provide the legal platform for ENP. Ultimately, this is 
also a commitment to a strict and differentiated bilateralism in terms of inter-institutional 
relations despite the fact that ENP also encourages its neighbouring countries to engage 
in sub-regional cooperation. Second, the Commission has declared that ENP constitutes a 
case for “joint ownership” (European Commission 2004: 8) of the institutions and of the 
process in general – albeit this ownership is “based on the awareness of shared values and 
common interests” (ibid.). Although the European Union does not explicitly state that the 
normative model is to be taken from the EU itself, it is clear that ENP countries are 
expected to converge unilaterally towards the normative model of the Union. This is 
clearly due to the internal constraints of EU governance, which make it extremely 
difficult to unpack agreements that have been painstakingly developed for the 15 
member-states that made up the EU prior to the 2004 enlargement. Furthermore, the EU 
reiterates what is already an essential part of the PCAs. For example, in the case of 
Ukraine, the PCA affirms that Ukraine needs to approximate its existing and future 
legislation to that of the Community.
9 The PCAs that entered into force in 1998 were 
only agreed to for an initial period of ten years. Therefore, the strong focus on these legal 
documents make it more likely that the PCAs will be renewed in order to avoid another 
lengthy discussion and ratification process for new treaties.
10 Third, the ENP sets up a 
procedure for monitoring the success as well as shortcomings of agreements made under 
ENP (‘naming and shaming’). 
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goals of ENP, the European Commission refined its existing country strategies. The ENP 
is being reshaped in order to be compatible with the existing framework of relationships 
between the EU and its neighbours. Each country strategy paper subsequently supplies a 
strategic framework for the period 2002-2006. Furthermore, these strategy papers set out 
EU cooperation goals and policy responses as well as identifying areas for cooperation 
which are defined as key priorities. In addition, the country strategy papers provide an 
assessment of the partner countries’ policy agendas, political and socio-economic 
situations as well as information about the EU’s response (for instance in the case of 
Jordan) “in more detail, highlighting programme objectives, expected results and 
conditionality in the priority fields of co-operation for the period 2002-2004” (Action 
plan EU-Jordan 2002: 2). 
The primary objective of the strategy papers was to define the scope and depth of 
cooperation, underpinned by financial aspects. Concomitantly, the European Commission 
drew up its first set of country reports. In May 2004, country reports were published on 
the first seven of the ENP countries which have Association or Partnership Agreements 
with the EU in force. A further five country reports were published in March 2005 on the 
next set of countries to be included in the policy (Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia), as 
well as with those countries whose Agreements had already come into force (Egypt and 
Lebanon). These reports provide an outline of the political, economic and social situation 
in the ENP countries. They also provide the space for future assessments on the 
achievements of each of the EU’s partner countries.  
  17The next stage in the development of ENP saw the conclusion of ENP Action 
Plans with each of the countries. In June 2004, the Council of the EU endorsed the 
Commission’s proposal: “Action plans should be comprehensive but at the same time 
identify clearly a limited number of key priorities and offer real incentives for reform. 
Action plans should also contribute, where possible, to regional cooperation” (Council of 
the EU 2004). Subsequently, a wide range of other areas have been emphasized. They 
jointly define an agenda of political and economic reform by means of short and medium-
term priorities (between 3 and 5 years). They cover political dialogue and reform, 
economic and social cooperation and development, trade-related issues and market and 
regulatory reform, cooperation in justice and home affairs, cooperation in sectors (such as 
transport, energy, information society, environment, research and development) as well 
as a human dimension (people-to-people contacts, civil society, education, public health). 
The incentives the EU offers in return for progress on relevant reforms are greater 
integration into European programs and networks, increased assistance and enhanced 
market access. 
Finally, the implementation of mutual commitments and objectives agreed upon 
in the action plans are subject to regular monitoring by the European Commission and the 
partner country. In addition, the European Commission issues periodic reports 
commenting on progress as well as shortcomings. This procedure clearly reinforces 
elements of conditionality by offering reviews of the relationship in exchange for 
compliance with jointly agreed commitments. According to the Deputy Head of 
Ukraine’s Mission to the EU, his country aims at “under-promising, but over-
  18delivering”
11 on the terms of its objectives set in the Action Plan. In December 2006, a 
first set of progress reports was released by the European Commission. 
Another important aspect in terms of policy-making refers to financial aspects. 
Until 2006, EU assistance to the countries covered by the European Neighbourhood 
Policy was channelled through various geographical programs, such as TACIS for the 
NIS and MEDA for the Mediterranean countries.
12 Today, financial allocations come 
from the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). Similar to the 
enlargement practice, assistance is set to be more flexible and ‘policy-driven’, designed 
to target sustainable development and approximation of EU policies and standards, as 
well as supporting the agreed-to priorities in the ENP Action Plans. One of its most 
innovative features is that it entails “a radical simplification to the current situation where 
cross-border cooperation at the external EU border is hampered by interfaces between 
internal and external funding instruments operating through different rules” (European 
Commission 2004: 3). This means that cross-border cooperation with non-EU countries 
will be considerably eased along the EU’s external land and sea borders in the east and in 
the south, putting partners under the same funding regime and instruments. The EU hopes 
to substantiate its goal of avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe as a 
result of these changes. 
ENPI also envisages extending forms of technical assistance to partner countries 
that had previously been used in the process of the CEECs rapprochement towards the 
EU, such as Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX), long-term 
twinning arrangements with EU member-states’ administrations (national, regional or 
local), as well as participation in Community programs and agencies. Moreover, the 
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with the authorities of the country, will have a ‘lighthouse effect’ in terms of guiding the 
programming of other assistance programs from other donor countries and institutions. 
After painstakingly difficult negotiations on the financial perspectives for the years 2007-
2013, a compromise was reached at the European Council in December 2005. The 
Council determined that the EU’s external action – including Pre-accession, Stability, 
Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation, ENP, Humanitarian aid and 
Macro-financial assistance – would receive approximately 50 billion Euro from 2007-13; 
ENP was to receive a share of approximately 20 per cent. 
The EU is particularly interested in securing peace and stability at its periphery. 
Hence, the ENP is also framed in terms of conflict prevention policy. The ENP Action 
Plans agreed to in 2005 and 2006 make ample reference to conflict prevention. Likewise, 
the ENP Country Strategy Papers feature references to territorial disputes and call for a 
‘shared responsibility’ for conflict settlement. Similarly, the Action Plans with Israel, 
Jordon, Morocco, Moldova and Ukraine, the Palestinian Authority and Tunisia all 
mention a ‘shared responsibility for conflict prevention and resolution’. So far, however, 
the ‘ENP approach’ to conflict resolution has yet to yield tangible results (European 
Commission 2006: 4). 
When the Council of the EU decided to include the Caucasian Republics in the 
ENP, conflict prevention had to occupy the top of the agenda. Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh represent symbols of Europe’s ‘frozen conflicts’. Border 
conflicts are very often at the origin of conflict in the post-Soviet space. Hence both 
Georgia and Moldova expressed hopes that the European Union and ENP would play a 
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Gänzle 2007). After a controversial debate among the member-states, the EU Border 
Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine was set up in November 2005 under the lead 
of the European Commission. Although it is an advisory, small-scale, technical body with 
no executive powers, it provides training and advice to Moldovan and Ukrainian officials, 
reinforcing their capacity to carry out effective customs controls and border surveillance. 
Ultimately, it is designed to contribute to building confidence and strengthening cross 
border cooperation, particularly with a view to resolving the ‘frozen conflict’ in 
Transnistria. 
As it has been demonstrated in the analysis of the policy-making processes of 
ENP, the European Commission occupies a very central role, comparable to the extent of 
Commission policy entrepreneurship within enlargement policy (in particular prior to the 
start of the accession talks). The Commission is very present when it comes to the daily 
management of ENP. The Commission services are pioneering the drafting of country 
strategy papers as well as, and more importantly, the action plans. Clearly, the European 
Commission can rely on a great deal of institutional memory given the fact that many of 
its services dealing with ENP today have been acquired and experienced as members of 
the Task Force of the Accession Negotiations (1998-99) or DG Enlargement (since 
1999). Between 2003 and 2004, at a time when DG Enlargement also assumed 
responsibility for the European Neighbourhood Policy, some Commission civil servants 
were transferred from DG Enlargement to DG External Affairs (including the former 
Head of the Commission Negotiation Team for the Czech Republic, Michael Leigh). In 
fall 2004 Benita Ferrero-Waldner took the helm of a portfolio that was renamed ‘External 
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and probably contributing to increased ‘enlargement/ENP’ thinking in the field of 
external relations. By all means, the ENP provides the European Commission with an 
additional arena to gain profile and informal competence in foreign policy areas, which 
are primarily associated with the Council of Ministers or the member states. 
However, any landmark decision in terms of ENP, whether it is the question of 
extending the scope of membership (to encompass the Caucasian Republics) or deciding 
on financial allocations, has to involve the member states, in particular the General 
Affairs Council. Country reports as well as action plans, drafted by the European 
Commission and ‘negotiated’ with each ENP country, are submitted to the Council which 
decides whether to proceed to the next stage of relations. Furthermore, the European 
Council as well as its Presidency provides additional guidelines as well as input. For 
instance, the German government announced in summer 2006 that it was planning to 
‘use’ its EU Council Presidency in the first half of 2007 to implement a more 
comprehensive European ‘Eastern Policy’. Clearly, this raised eyebrows among Southern 
EU member states, who are “encouraging the ensuing Portuguese EU Presidency to 
rebalance this towards the South” (Missiroli 2007: 3). In this context, the role of the new 
EU member states cannot be under-estimated. Poland – together with Lithuania – has 
played an important role in orchestrating the EU’s approach to Ukraine since the Orange 
Revolution. During the ‘revolution’ itself, both East European countries were of key 
importance in getting the High Representative of the CFSP involved. Furthermore, the 
Baltic States play an important role in providing advice and support to post-Soviet 
governments, such as in Georgia, for all questions relating to market economic reform 
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immediate vicinity of a hostile regional power such the Russian Federation. There are 
also many members of the European Parliament from the new EU countries that are far 
more willing to take a critical stance vis-à-vis Russian (domestic as much as foreign) 
politics. 
Still, the European Commission, together with the European Parliament, is well-
positioned to explore and suggest policy ideas (such as for instance the proposal to 
include the Caucasus in the ENP). The Parliament drafted several reports on the state and 
prospect of ENP and took credit for the inclusion of the countries of the Caucasus in the 
neighbourhood policy “at the insistence of the European Parliament” (European 
Parliament 2005: 14). Furthermore, the Parliament has provided a platform to leaders of 
ENP countries, in particular the President of Ukraine, Victor Yushchenko, to express his 
hopes for further European integration of his country – beyond the offer of ENP. In 
general, the European Parliament has taken a very supportive view with regards to the 
membership aspirations of the European partner countries in ENP. Members of the 
Parliament have been in favour of contemplating the inclusion of Central Asian countries 
into ENP, in particular Kazakhstan. Overall, the European Parliament is only loosely 
associated with policy-making processes within ENP and struggling hard to ensure that 
its co-decision authority in allocating the ENPI budget is reemphasized (as the 
Commission proposed to decouple the European Neighbourhood Policy from the ENPI 
budget). 
Hence it is sometimes difficult to clearly attribute specific policy measures to 
either of the two central European institutions, the Council and the Commission, with 
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defines the major rules, and the Commission plays the game – at least at the operational 
level. Furthermore, the new member states are likely to assume a major role when it 
comes to the issue of long-term sustainability of the European Neighbourhood Policy as a 
very unique policy area and arena within the EU’s external relations. 
 
V. The European Neighbourhood Policy and New Modes of Governance  
Similar to EU enlargement, the European Neighbourhood Policy presents a fascinating 
policy field in which to explore the emergence of (new) modes of governance. 
Entrenched in the path-dependent evolution of EU external relations and enlargement (as 
we have seen in the previous section), the ENP exhibits all four modes of governance 
identified in the introduction to this volume: hierarchy, negotiation, competition and 
cooperation. Yet, which modes of governance have prevailed thus far in this process? 
Furthermore, do the modes of governance dominant in the development of ENP warrant 
recognition as new and innovative? Lastly, have shifts of governance modes occurred 
over time?  
It is clear that various forms of negotiation and dialog have increased under the 
umbrella of ENP. Since the ENP builds upon existing agreements between the EU and 
the partner country in question (Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, or Association 
Agreements in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership), these negotiations 
take place – as argued by Tömmel and Verdun elsewhere in this volume – on both a 
horizontal axis linking various European institutions with one another and a vertical axis 
including (non-) member states’ governments, political parties, and public opinion. On 
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Cooperation Council and Association Council), but also the European Parliament and 
semi-organs such as the Committee of the Regions or the ECOSOC are part of the 
deliberations. These negotiations, defining short-term and medium-term objectives within 
the ENP partnership, are goal-driven in a sense that both representatives form the EU and 
the ENP country discuss the scope of reform into which each partner country ultimately 
wishes or is capable to engage. The European Commission is eager to emphasise that the 
ENP Action Plan “is fully negotiated and mutually agreed at political level. It is not an 
imposition by either side, but an agreed agenda for common work” (European 
Commission 2006: 3). Of course, these negotiations do not occur in a political vacuum. 
They mirror individual countries’ preferences vis-à-vis the extent and policy breadth of 
the ENP. After the election of Nicolas Sarkozy as new French President in May 2007, it 
is likely that France, for instance, will step up its efforts to create a ‘Mediterranean union’ 
within ENP, thus fostering the links with Southern neighbours of the Mediterranean rim. 
Poland, in turn, can be expected to take – together with Germany – some more interest 
for its immediate Eastern neighbours, in particular Ukraine and Belarus. Clearly, these 
negotiations can be formal as well as informal; however, by all means they rely on 
arguments as much as the promise of tangible benefits from engaging into this specific 
kind of relationship. 
Without any concrete prospect of future membership at stake, however, we cannot 
expect hierarchy to be a strong feature of ENP. One may argue though, that some of the 
negotiations take place in the shadow of hierarchy, where the partner countries expect 
future benefits – including the prospect of membership – in exchange for compliance. 
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underpinned by domestic conditions in each of the partner countries and the interest of 
each individual government in subscribing to these goals. It is for these reasons that 
Commission officials argue that “successful participation in the ENP requires that the 
pace of convergence to the EU and the internal process of economic reform are matched” 
(Dodini/Fanitini 2006: 530). Still, the ENP entails various elements and instruments to 
make ‘compliance’ an attractive policy goal for the partner countries: First, the PCAs and 
Association Agreements contain ‘human rights clauses’ which make the provision of 
financial assistance conditional upon the fulfilment of human rights standards (however, 
the implementation of these clauses has been subject to criticism from various NGO 
groups) (Kelley 2006: 46). Second, the PCA with Ukraine, for example, explicitly 
mandates that the country must ensure the approximation of its economic legislation 
towards EU standards (Article 55). Third, the ENP makes any further improvement in 
terms of the bilateral relationship, such as the development of “deep and comprehensive 
free trade agreements (European Commission 2006: 4)”, visa facilitation, participation in 
EU policies and agencies contingent upon convergence towards EU norms and standards. 
Similar to the practice in enlargement policies, the ENP sets up monitoring procedures 
(regular reports) that scrutinizes progress and shortcomings in various policy sectors. 
Most of the achievements in recent EU-Ukraine relations for instance, such as the 
opening of negotiations on visa facilitation and readmission agreements, are pursued in a 
highly hierarchical manner, where Ukraine ultimately is required to adjust towards EU 
expectations and standards. In turn, Russia (to give the example of a non-ENP 
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particular is highly dependant on its energy supplies.  
The EU would like to see its neighbours adopt values such as the rule of law, 
democracy and respect for human rights and minority rights in accordance with the 
norms and standards (political pluralism, freedom of speech and media, respect for the 
rights of persons belonging to national minorities, non discrimination on grounds of 
gender, and on political, religious and ethnic ground) set forth by the OSCE and the 
Council of Europe (as in the case of Ukraine). The ENP Action Plan encourages a wide 
range of initiatives in interregional and cross-border cooperation arrangements involving 
the sub-national level(s), targeting public health, fostering local democracy and civil 
society as well as building strong national education programs. 
As for competition, the ENP aims at the establishment of two different 
frameworks: a first one between the ENP countries themselves, and second one between 
the EU and the ENP countries. The first one subscribes to a long standing (‘declaratory’) 
EU foreign policy practice which is to frame regional or sub-regional cooperation (in 
virtually every part of the world) as a primary stepping stone towards closer relations 
with the European Union. The formation of Visegrad group of states, comprising Poland, 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, founded in the early 1990s, was a response to 
this EU foreign policy goal. Similarly, the European Neighbourhood Policy was set up as 
a comprehensive framework inspired from the inclusive approach of the European 
Conference. An example for the second approach is the establishment of “a policy 
dialogue between EU and Ukrainian authorities in the field of education and training” 
(EU-Ukraine Action Plan 2004: 39). The Action Plan encourages Ukraine to fully 
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compatibility of the Ukrainian university system with that of EU member-states.
13 The 
Bologna club may be interpreted as a way to increase non-compliance-driven 
benchmarking efforts and mutual learning processes within and outside the European 
Union. In this respect the European Neighbourhood Policy absorbs modes of governance 
that have been introduced by the Open Method of Coordination – a system of 
coordination that emerged with the Lisbon European Council of 2000. 
Since the establishment of the European Neighbourhood Policy, there has been a 
significant increase of ‘networks’ (Lavanex 2004) seeking to facilitate and improve 
cooperation amongst the participating partners. One of the key mechanisms for driving 
EU-inspired external reforms resides with the “perspective of moving beyond 
cooperation to a significant degree of integration, including a stake in the EU’s Internal 
Market and the possibility for Ukraine to participate progressively in key aspects of EU 
policies and programs” (EU-Ukraine Action Plan 2004: 2) Yet it is not only the ENP 
country which will benefit from closer forms of inclusion in EU programs and policies. 
In the case of Ukraine, the EU aims at getting access to the country’s Antonov fleet in 
order to cope with its weak capabilities vis-à-vis its airlift capabilities and to boost its 
credibility in terms of ESDP. Thus, the success of ENP ultimately will depend on the 
stakes both partners hold in this process. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Similar to EU enlargement, this chapter has demonstrated that all different modes of 
governance identified in this volume – hierarchy, negotiation, competition and 
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European Neighbourhood Policy. Negotiation may be grasped best as a form of dialog 
between ‘partners’ presumably on an equal footing. Although the European Commission 
has stressed the open-endedness and the partnership-approach it is correct to assume that 
negotiations – at the level of the ENP action plans – occur in the shadow of hierarchy as 
some of the ENP countries clearly expect the relationship to evolve into future 
membership. Hence, similar to the practice of enlargement, hierarchy plays a role albeit 
in different ways in conjunction with the level of commitment and foreign policy design 
of each ENP partner country. Through the lens of the governance school, it is this 
particular soft or silent imposition of hierarchy that brings ENP close to the enlargement 
path. Much more dominant, however, are softer modes of governance such as 
competition and cooperation within ENP. The overall framework of ENP which lumps 
together (potentially) sixteen countries has a competitive edge where each country may 
seek to set itself ahead of the others on scoreboards used by the Commission services in 
order to assess success in various policy areas. However, it is also fair to say that most of 
the ENP countries have not responded positively to this comprehensive approach, and 
seek instead to increase the bilateral component of ENP. Hence, cooperation is to be seen 
as the strongest mode of governance discernible within ENP.  
Still, ENP is a very young EU external policy. Thus it is difficult to assess 
whether changes in terms of modes of governance have already occurred. However, as 
the analysis has clearly shown, we should not expect the European Commission to play a 
strong role in the medium term as – similar to the process of EU enlargement – the 
intergovernmental institutions are unlikely to loosen their grip on ENP. As such, the 
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although the European Commission as well as the Parliament are trying hard to raise their 
profiles. In a nutshell, while cooperation and competition prevail at the operational level, 
ultimately, the European Council will diligently observe that negotiations between the 
EU and ENP countries do not bind EU member states in terms of future accessions.  
Albeit entrenched in a particular realm of external relations and enlargement 
policies, the modes of governance in the European Neighbourhood Policy are not new. 
What can be learned from the analysis is that different modes are far from being subject 
to a binary logic; instead, as we have seen for instance in the case of hierarchy and 
negotiation, they must be perceived as closely interlinked. In this respect, we may assume 
that comparisons of modes of governance in one policy area, such as external relations, 
will allow drawing some conclusions about how the European Union interacts with the 
‘outside’. It will further our understanding of particular dynamics and patterns of EU-
third country relationship. While the modes of governance in the realm of ENP are not 
new, the dynamic composition of the governance mix is surprising. While ENP heavily 
relies on cooperation and competition, negotiation and hierarchy are far from being 
absent. 
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* Draft chapter for Ingeborg Tömmel and Amy Verdun (eds) Governance and Policy-Making in the 
European Union. 
1 In general, I use the term EU to refer to the European Union after the introduction of the Maastricht 
Treaty. ‘European Community (EC)’ specifically refers to the first pillar of the European Union or the time 
prior to the Treaty of Maastricht. 
2 The concept relates to the so called Karaganov doctrine enshrined in Russian 1993 Foreign Policy 
Concept. The concept emphasizes the role of the post-Soviet space as a natural area of Russian interest. 
3 The Forward Studies Unit was created in 1989 at a proposal of Jacques Delors, then President of the 
European Commission, and placed under the direct responsibility of the Commission President. 
4 I consider the term ‘external EU governance’ as used elsewhere in the literature to be problematic for it 
seems to suggest a difference between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ governance modes. 
5 For a comprehensive overview on the EU’s policy towards the East European countries of this ‘grey zone’ 
(Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova) as well as Russia, see Stefan Gänzle, EU-Russia Relations and the 
Repercussions on the ‘In-betweens’, in: Oliver Schmidtke and Serhy Yekelchyk (ed.), Europe’s Last 
Frontier, London: Palgrave 2007 (forthcoming) 
6 Algeria, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Armenia, Jordan, Syria, Azerbaijan, Lebanon, Tunisia, Ukraine, 
Egypt, Moldova, Georgia, Morocco have been promoted to the rank of ‘ENP partner’ countries. Because of 
their weak democratic records, Libya and Belarus, however, have not yet been admitted to the ENP. 
7 One should not ignore, though, that the ENP did not meet the high aspirations of the Ukrainian 
government in 2004. Contrary to Moldova, Ukraine was always eager to acquire an EU membership option 
since the early 1990s. 
8 This country approach encouraged at the same time various forms of sub-regional cooperation (Visegrad 
states of Poland, Hungary, the Czech and the Slovak Republics; Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS); 
Black Sea cooperation, etc.). 
9 See European Union, Partnership and Cooperation of the European Communities and their Member States 
and Ukraine, OJ 1998 L49/3, p. 41: “The Parties recognize that an important condition for strengthening 
the economic links between Ukraine and the Community is the approximation of Ukraine’s existing and 
future legislation to that of the Community. Ukraine shall endeavor to ensure that its legislation will be 
gradually made compatible with that of the Community.” 
10 See Article 101 of the PCA with Ukraine, which stipulates: “This Agreement is concluded for an initial 
period of ten years. The Agreement shall be automatically renewed year by year provided that neither Party 
gives the other Party written notice of denunciation of the Agreement six months before it expires.” 
11 Interview of the author with Kostiantyn Yelisieiev, Deputy Head of Ukraine’s Mission to the EU, 
Brussels, May 30, 2005. 
12 These programs include TACIS (for its eastern neighbours and Russia) and MEDA (for its southern 
Mediterranean neighbours), as well as thematic programmes such as European Initiative for Democracy 
and Human Rights (EIDHR). The budgetary period covering 2000-2006) releases funds of approximately 
€5.3 billion for MEDA and €3.1 billion for TACIS; in addition the European Investment Bank lends 
approximately €2 billion to MEDA beneficiary countries and €500 million to TACIS beneficiary countries. 
13 Ukraine joined the ‘Bologna club’ together with the other Eastern ENP countries Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
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